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THE LAUTSI DECISION AND THE AMERICAN 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE EXPERIENCE:  A 
RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR WEILER 
William P. Marshall* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Lautsi v. Italy,1 the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) held that 
an Italian law requiring crucifixes to be displayed in public school classrooms did 
not violate the European Convention on Human Rights (“European Convention”).2  
In so holding, the ECHR sent the message that it would not incorporate American 
nonestablishment norms into its interpretation of the European Convention.   
The key advocate behind the Lautsi decision was Professor Joseph Weiler.  
Representing the nations intervening in the case on behalf of Italy,3 Professor 
Weiler took the lead in arguing against a strict nonestablishment interpretation of 
the European Convention—the position that the Lautsi Court subsequently 
adopted.  Few persons, therefore, are as qualified as Professor Weiler to address the 
issues raised by the Lautsi decision, and I am humbled to share this forum with 
him.   
I am not an authority on the European Convention and cannot offer any 
opinion as to whether or not Lautsi was correctly decided under that Treaty.  But 
the Lautsi decision raises a number of issues that also are present in American 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence; and it is from that perspective that I will 
attempt to offer some insight.4  The remainder of this Essay is devoted to this 
project.  Part II looks to American Establishment Clause jurisprudence for reasons 
that support Professor Weiler’s position against a strict nonestablishment mandate.  
Part III presents some of the insights from Establishment Clause jurisprudence that 
militates against Professor Weiler’s approach.  Part IV offers a brief conclusion.  
II.  THE AMERICAN NONESTABLISHMENT EXPERIENCE  
AS SUPPORT FOR PROFESSOR WEILER’S POSITION IN LAUTSI 
If American nonestablishment law influenced the Lautsi decision at all, it 
could well have been by negative example.  American Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence is problematic on a number of counts.  First, Establishment Clause 
case law is doctrinally incoherent.  Second, nonestablishment principles often 
conflict with other important constitutional interests and with American history and 
culture.  Third, nonestablishment is not neutral towards religion, although it is often 
defended on those grounds.  Rather the nonestablishment principle presents its own 
religious viewpoint and for that reason may be considered problematic even under 
                                                                                                     
 * Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. 
 1. Lautsi v. Italy, 54 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (2011). 
 2. Id.  
 3. Notably, Professor Weiler represented his clients pro bono. 
 4. For an excellent comparative analysis of nonestablishment issues in the United States and 
Europe, see Claudia E. Haupt, Transnational Nonestablishment, 80 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 991 (2012). 
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its own terms.  Each of these points will be discussed in turn.  
A.  Doctrinal Confusion 
One of the strongest arguments against exporting the American approach to 
nonestablishment is the state of Establishment Clause doctrine.  Few areas in 
constitutional law are as muddled as the Establishment Clause;5 even the United 
States Supreme Court itself has acknowledged the lack of cohesion in this area.6  
Where else, after all, has the Court candidly acknowledged that it has “sacrifice[d] 
clarity and predictability for flexibility”?7  Where else has a Supreme Court Justice 
described (accurately) a governing constitutional test as being like “some ghoul in a 
late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after 
being repeatedly killed and buried”?8  
The Court’s inconsistencies in this area are longstanding and date back to the 
first major Establishment Clause case, Everson v. Board of Education.9  The issue 
in Everson was whether a state program that provided bus transportation to students 
attending religious schools violated the Establishment Clause because the 
transportation assistance effectively worked to subsidize religious education.  In 
setting the stage for its future unintelligibility on the subject, the Everson Court 
famously stated that under the Establishment Clause “[n]o tax in any amount, large 
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities . . .”10 and further 
announced that the Establishment Clause was intended to erect “‘a wall of 
separation’ between church and state.”11  It then proceeded to uphold the state aid 
program in question.12 
The Court continued this pattern of inconsistency in later cases.  It upheld 
legislative prayer13 while striking down prayer in public schools14 and at public 
                                                                                                     
 5. See  B. Jessie Hill, Of Christmas Trees and Corpus Christi: Ceremonial Deism and Change in 
Meaning Over Time, 59 DUKE L.J. 705, 727 (2010) (there is considerable confusion in the tests the 
Court applies in Establishment Clause cases); Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of 
“Tests” Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 323, 323 (1995) (noting that the tests the 
Courts apply in religion clause cases are in “nearly total disarray”); Daniel O. Conkle, The 
Establishment Clause and Religious Expression in Governmental Settings: Four Variables in Search of 
A Standard, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 315, 315 (2007) (“Establishment Clause doctrine is a muddled mess”). 
 6. Lee v. Weisman ex rel. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992) (“Our jurisprudence in this area is 
of necessity one of line-drawing . . . .”).  See also Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n. v. American Atheists, 
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 13 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence is in “shambles”). 
 7. Comm. for Pub. Educ. &Religious Liberty v Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980). 
 8. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (describing the Court’s application of the Establishment Clause test set forth in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)). 
 9. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 10. Id. at 16. 
 11. Id. (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). 
 12. Id. at 17.  As Justice Jackson stated in his dissent:  “the undertones of the opinion, advocating 
complete and uncompromising separation . . . seem utterly discordant with its conclusion . . . .” Id. at 19. 
 13. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 14. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 
(1963). 
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school football games.15  It ruled that taxpayers have standing to challenge 
programs in which Congress appropriates funds used to support religion,16 but 
taxpayers do not have standing if government aid to religion is provided by the 
federal executive branch.17  It determined that a state’s providing tax credits to 
parents of children attending religious schools is unconstitutional18 but providing 
tax deductions is permissible.19  
The Court’s decisions dealing with public displays of religious symbols are 
even more mind-bending.20  According to Court doctrine, some public displays of 
nativity scenes are constitutional21 while others are not,22 with the difference 
ostensibly being how secularized is the display.23   Add Santa Claus and a reindeer 
or two to your nativity scene presentation and you may avoid First Amendment 
scrutiny.24  Exhibit the crèche by itself and you may find yourself on the losing end 
of a civil rights suit.25  
The Court’s treatment of public displays of the Ten Commandments fares no 
better.  To the Court, a recent posting of a plaque of the Ten Commandments on the 
walls of a Kentucky courthouse is unconstitutional,26 but the long-standing 
exhibition of a large Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the Texas 
Capitol Building is constitutionally permissible.27  
Notably, moreover, it is not only the discrepancies in the results in the public 
display cases that is confounding.  It is often the way the Court reaches those 
results that stretches the imagination.  One ploy that the Court often uses, for 
example, is claiming that a religious symbol or practice is no longer religious.  In 
the Court’s first nativity scene case, Lynch v. Donnelly,28 for example, the Court 
upheld the Christmas display in part based on its conclusion that the Christmas 
holiday had become “secular[ized].”29  In McGowan v. Maryland,30 the Court 
                                                                                                     
 15. Santa Fe Independent Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
 16. Flast v. Cohen 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (granting taxpayer standing to challenge a federal spending 
program used in part to assist private religious schools). 
 17. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 
U.S. 464, 486 (1982); Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 605 (2007) (taxpayers do 
not have standing to challenge expenditures by the federal executive although taxpayers would have 
standing to challenge the same types of expenditures if appropriated by Congress). 
 18. Comm. for Pub. Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
 19. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
 20. B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic Critique of the 
Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491, 492 (2005) (“The treatment of Establishment Clause 
challenges to displays of religious symbolism by the Supreme Court and the lower courts is notoriously 
unpredictable . . . .”). 
 21. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 22. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
 23. Jay D. Wexler, The Rehnquist Court and the First Amendment:  The Endorsement Court, 21 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 263, 268 (2006) (“Lynch teaches that government may celebrate Christmas in 
some manner and form, but not in a way that endorses Christian doctrine.”).  Id. at 269. 
 24. See Lynch 465 U.S. at 668. 
 25. See Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 573. 
 26. McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
 27. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
 28. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 29. Id. at 685. 
 30. 366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
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upheld the constitutionality of a Sunday closing law on the grounds that those laws 
were essentially secular even though the religious basis and purpose of those laws 
was directly stated in the prologue to the challenged provision and the criminal 
sanction attached to the law was denominated “Sabbath breaking.”31  And consider, 
in this respect, the Court’s recent maneuver in Salazar v. Buono,32 the case 
examining whether the government display of a cross on public land violated the 
Establishment Clause.  Unlike Professor Weiler, who in the Lautsi case was 
customarily forthright in proclaiming that the crucifix is a religious symbol,33 the 
United States Supreme Court in Salazar somehow came to the conclusion that a 
cross used to memorialize the death of soldiers has a “complex meaning beyond the 
expression of religious views.”34  
Finally, Establishment Clause jurisprudence also, at times, appears to devolve 
into little more than ad hoc decision-making.  In Marsh v. Chambers,35 for 
example, the Court ignored its governing Establishment Clause test in order to 
uphold the constitutionality of legislative prayer.36  In Elk Grove Unified School 
Dist. v. Newdow,37 the Court chose to create an entirely new standing doctrine in 
order to avoid reaching the constitutionality of the inclusion of the words “under 
God” in the Pledge of Allegiance.38  
Establishment Clause case law, then, is anything but a model of sound 
jurisprudence.  It is therefore no wonder why one might be reluctant to suggest that 
it be adopted by the European Court of Human Rights as a guidepost for 
interpreting the religious liberty guarantees of the European Convention.  The 
ECHR presumably can do better. 
B.  The Contradictions Within the Nonestablishment Approach 
In the Court’s defense, however, its incoherent jurisprudence may not 
necessarily be simply unprincipled decision-making.  Rather, and pertinent to our 
discussion, it may reflect a deeper understanding that a wholesale adoption of the 
American nonestablishment principle would be problematic.39  There are legitimate 
reasons why the jurisprudence is so jumbled.  The nonestablishment mandate is 
                                                                                                     
 31. Id. app. at 453.  
 32. 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010). 
 33. See JHH Weiler, Freedom of Religion and Freedom from Religion:  The European Model, 65 
ME L. REV. 759 (2013). 
 34. 130 S. Ct. at 1818.  At oral argument, Justice Scalia appeared to take the position that the use of 
the cross to commemorate war dead had no religious significance at all.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 
38-39, Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (No. 08-472). 
 35. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 36. Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court makes no pretense of subjecting Nebraska's 
practice of legislative prayer to any of the formal "tests" that have traditionally structured our inquiry 
under the Establishment Clause.”).  
 37. 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
 38. The Court ruled that the plaintiff in the case, a divorced father, did not have standing to raise the 
Establishment Clause challenge to the Pledge because he was not his daughter’s custodial parent.  Id. at 
14-18.   
 39. I have expanded on the reasons why Establishment Clause jurisprudence is pervaded by inherent 
contradictions in an earlier work.  See William P. Marshall “We Know It When We See It”:  The 
Supreme Court and Establishment,  59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 495 (1985-1986). 
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beset by countervailing interests and the Court’s understandable reluctance to 
override these interests explains, at least in part, the resulting doctrinal confusion.  
In Everson, for example, although the Court expressed its intention to conform to 
nonestablishment principles, it was also concerned that not allowing the state to 
provide transportation aid to parochial school children might evidence improper 
hostility towards religion.40   
Other conflicts may arise from the interaction of the Establishment Clause with 
the Free Exercise and/or the Free Speech Clause.  In the case of free exercise, the 
very wording of the First Amendment seems to generate contradiction.  The 
Religion Clauses provide: “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”41  Taken 
literally, then, the text seems to simultaneously require that the state accord religion 
special protection (the Free Exercise Clause) and that it provide religion no special 
deference (the Establishment Clause). 
The tension is not theoretical.  Consider a public school teacher whose religion 
requires her to wear religious headgear or religious clothing.  If the state denied her 
the right to wear the headgear or clothing, it could potentially raise Free Exercise 
concerns.42  At the same time, allowing her to wear the headgear or clothing might 
present an Establishment Clause problem if her actions are seen as constituting 
state-sanctioned religious practice in the public school classroom.  
Free speech case law, meanwhile, is replete with examples of Establishment 
Clause conflicts with the Speech Clause.  The state may believe that 
nonestablishment principles mean that it should not allow its classrooms to be used 
for prayer meetings,43its parks to be used for displays of religious symbols by 
private groups,44 or its monies to be used to fund a student religious organization’s 
efforts to disseminate a religious message.45  But free speech requirements may 
demand that the state provide such benefits to religious entities anyway.46 
                                                                                                     
 40. Everson v. Bd. of Ed., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). 
 41. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 42. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (addressing the lack of free exercise right of a 
member of the military to wear religious headgear in contravention of military uniform requirements).  
To be sure, under current doctrine the teacher’s Free Exercise Claim will likely be denied.  See Emp’t. 
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–879 (1990) (holding that religious believers are not entitled to 
constitutionally-based exemptions from neutral laws under the Free Exercise Clause).  But see the 
opinion of then Circuit Justice Alito in Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of 
Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 366-67 & n.7 (3d Cir. 1999) cert. denied 528 U.S. 817 (1999) (holding Muslim 
police officers had a free exercise right to keep their beards despite a police policy requiring officers to 
be clean shaven). 
 43. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 & n.4 (2001); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. 
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393–94 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 
(1981).   
 44. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995). 
 45. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995). 
 46. The Court has held that the state violated the free speech right of religious groups to have access 
to public school classrooms when the school allowed non-religious groups to use the facilities.  See 
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112, 112 n.4 (2001); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. 
Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393–394 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 
277 (1981).  It held the University of Virginia violated the free speech rights of a student organization 
when it did not give them funding to spread their religious message while at the same time funding non-
religious groups disseminating their respective messages.  See Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of 
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At times, moreover, nonestablishment principles may even be at war with 
themselves.  Nonestablishment principles suggest that the state should not aid 
religion but that it also should not entangle itself in religious matters.  But what 
then should the Court do when faced with a religious property tax exemption 
(which undoubtedly aids religion) and the possibility that not providing such an 
exemption might lead the government to collect unpaid tax bills by executing liens 
on churches or requiring forced sales (which undoubtedly would entangle church 
and state).  When faced with this exact problem, the Court therefore relied in part 
on nonestablishment grounds in upholding the religious property exemption.47  
Finally, nonestablishment principles commonly conflict with many deeply-
embedded religious cultural traditions and symbols that pervade the American 
landscape.  American cities are named St. Paul, Corpus Christi, San Francisco, and 
Los Angeles.  National holidays include Thanksgiving and Christmas.  The 
national anthem is replete with religious references,48 the phrase ‘under God’ is in 
the Pledge of Allegiance,49 and the national motto is “In God We Trust.”  Mark 
DeWolfe was therefore correct when he noted that there exists in America a “de 
facto establishment.”50   
The fact that there are such de facto establishments existing in the American 
culture, of course, does not mean that they are constitutional.  After all, school 
prayer was commonly recited in the public schools and might have been considered 
an aspect of the de facto establishment until the Court struck down the practice in 
Engel v. Vitale51 and Abington School District v. Schempp.52  But the price of 
excising all aspects of religion from American culture would be extraordinarily 
steep as well as self-defeating.  For one, such an approach may exacerbate, rather 
than ameliorate, the concern with religious divisiveness that the Establishment 
                                                                                                     
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995).  And it held that denying the Ku Klux Klan the right to display 
a cross on public property violated the Klan’s First Amendment speech rights.  See Capitol Square 
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995). 
 47. Walz v. Tax Commission of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970) (“The hazards of churches 
supporting government are hardly less in their potential than the hazards of government supporting 
churches; each relationship carries some involvement rather than the desired insulation and 
separation.”). 
 48. The final verse of the Star Spangled Banner reads: 
O, thus be it ever when freemen shall stand,  
Between their lov'd homes and the war's desolation;  
Blest with vict'ry and peace, may the heav'n-rescued land  
Praise the Pow'r that hath made and preserv'd us as a nation!  
Then conquer we must, when our cause is just,  
And this be our motto:  “In God is our trust” 
And the star-spangled banner in triumph shall wave  
O'er the land of the free and the home of the brave! 
 49. The constitutionality of the inclusion of the phrase “under God” in the Pledge was challenged in 
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).  The Court did not reach the merits, 
however, ruling that the Plaintiff did not have standing to maintain the action.  Id. at 17-18. 
 50. MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 6 (1965).  Indeed even the liberal 
icon jurist William O. Douglas once noted that “[w]e are a religious people whose institutions 
presuppose a Supreme Being.”  Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). 
 51. 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962). 
 52. 374 U.S. 203, 225-27 (1963). 
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Clause was thought to address.53  In this respect, Justice Breyer’s concurring 
opinion upholding the display of the Ten Commandments in Van Orden v. Perry54 
is exactly on point:  
[T]o reach a contrary conclusion here, based primarily upon on the religious nature 
of the tablets’ text would, I fear, lead the law to exhibit a hostility toward religion 
that has no place in our Establishment Clause traditions. Such a holding might well 
encourage disputes concerning the removal of longstanding depictions of the Ten 
Commandments from public buildings across the Nation. And it could thereby 
create the very kind of religiously based divisiveness that the Establishment 
Clause seeks to avoid.55 
The problem of too rigidly enforcing the Establishment Clause, moreover, is 
not only that it could cause, and likely has caused, its own form of divisiveness.56  
As Robert Bellah and others have taught us, social cohesion depends upon 
communities sharing beliefs, symbols, and rituals.57  In the United States, many of 
those beliefs, symbols, and rituals that reflect our heritage and tradition are 
religious.  Removing those religious artifacts of the public culture would damage 
those societal bonds as well as artificially ignore foundational aspects of American 
history.58  
C.  The Non-Neutrality of the Nonestablishment Model 
Finally, the nonestablishment position is also weakened because, as Professor 
Weiler has argued, one of its central assertions is not accurate.  The constitutional 
commitment to the nonestablishment principle is often defended on the grounds 
that this principle is religiously neutral.  But as Weiler points out, this claim is 
                                                                                                     
 53. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971) ("[P]olitical debate and division . . . are 
normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of government, but political division along 
religious lines was one of the principal evils against which [the First Amendment's religious clauses 
were] . . . intended to protect.").  See also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 718 (2002) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (lessening divisiveness is a “basic First Amendment objective”); Richard 
Schragger, The Relative Irrelevance of the Establishment Clause, 89 TEX. L. REV. 583, 604 (2011) (anti-
divisiveness is an Establishment Clause concern).  But see Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and 
the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667, 1720 (2006) (contending that the concern with religious 
divisiveness is misplaced). 
 54. 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
 55. Id. at 704 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 56. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 279, 341-42 (2001) (noting that the rise of the religious right in the United States was a 
reaction to a perception that the country had become overly secular). 
 57. Robert Bellah, BEYOND BELIEF 171 (1970) (discussing “civil religion”); see also Michael M. 
Maddigan, The Establishment Clause, Civil Religion, and the Public Church, 81 CAL. L. REV. 293, 321 
(1993). 
 58. This is, of course, not to say that a nation needs to expand its exhibition of religious symbols, as 
Italy did in Lautsi, in order to preserve its culture.  Lautsi v. Italy, 54 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (2011).  The Court 
actually may have had it right in the Ten Commandments cases when it struck down a recently posted 
version yet upheld one that had been in place for over fifty years.  Compare McCreary County, Ky. v. 
ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (striking down a recent posting of the Ten Commandments) with 
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality opinion) (upholding a monument of the Ten 
Commandments recognizing the historical meaning of the piece). 
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false.59  First, the position is not neutral with respect to religion and secularism.  
The secular notion that government should not base its laws on religious principles 
and authority is itself religiously-laden as it depends upon a particular view of the 
relationship between church and state that comports with the beliefs of some 
religions but not others.60  Treating a secular nonestablishment as if it presents the 
correct view of the relationship of government and religion, therefore, is not 
religiously neutral.61  Consider in this respect the fundamentalist claim that 
morality cannot be taught without religion.62  To those who share this belief, the 
public schools’ teaching of morality without religious foundation expresses a 
religious point of view.  And, more alarmingly for their purposes, it expresses a 
religious point of view that contradicts and is hostile to their own.63  Thus, when 
the nonestablishment principle is interpreted to prohibit the state from teaching the 
proposition that morality is derived from religion, the result is not religiously 
neutral.  From the fundamentalist perspective, it is biased against fundamentalist 
beliefs. 
Second, the nonestablishment assertion that the state must be neutral among 
religions is not even neutral among religions.  It prefers the beliefs of religions who 
believe in religious neutrality to those theologies that assert otherwise.64  To be 
sure, one might argue that the fact that some religions may view neutrality as 
‘religious’ does not actually make it religious.  It is ‘religious’ only from one point 
of view.  True neutrality, however, does not allow differing views or perspectives 
to be summarily dismissed or discounted.  Taking neutrality seriously means that 
there is no privileged standing point from which to make universal observations of 
what is neutral and what is not.    
III.  THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NONESTABLISHMENT NORM 
There are, however, powerful reasons for not too quickly rejecting the 
nonestablishment approach.  Let me suggest two.  The first responds to Professor 
Weiler’s description of the Establishment Clause as expressing a principle of 
“freedom from religion.”65  The second pertains to the divisiveness along religious 
lines that would inevitably follow if the state’s choice of a favored religion was a 
matter subject to political debate. 
                                                                                                     
 59. See JHH Weiler, Freedom of Religion and Freedom from Religion:  The European Model, 65 
ME. L. REV. 759 (2013). 
 60. See Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 763, 765 (1993). 
 61. For a fuller development of this argument that secularism is not neutral, see William P. 
Marshall, The Limits of Secularism: Public Religious Expression in Moments of National Crisis and 
Tragedy, 78 NOTRE DAME. L. REV. 11 (2002). 
 62. A similar claim was advanced by the plaintiffs in Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 
F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 63. See generally Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, “He Drew A Circle That Shut Me Out”: Assimilation, 
Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581 (1993). 
 64. Id. 
 65. See JHH Weiler, Freedom of Religion and Freedom from Religion:  The European Model, 65 
ME. L. REV. 759 (2013). 
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A.  The Anti-Corruption Principle 
Professor Weiler’s characterization of the nonestablishment principle as 
“freedom from religion” implies that the battle in Lautsi and other cases dealing 
with state support of religion is one between purportedly pro-religion forces 
seeking religion in public life on one side and “freedom from religion” secularists 
seeking to cleanse the public square from religion on the other.  Actually, however, 
the American experience suggests that it is inaccurate to describe the 
nonestablishment debate in these terms.  The American roots of the 
nonestablishment principle lie in Evangelical Christianity and not in modern 
secularism.  Religious leaders like Isaac Backus66 and Roger Williams67 supported 
separationist principles because they believed there was no better way to corrupt 
religion than asking government to support it.  Williams, for example, objected to 
state support of religion because he believed such aid would only serve to weaken 
churches by fostering their dependence upon government and subjecting them to 
“worldly corruptions.”68  To Williams and others, church-state separation was 
thought to be a mechanism to strengthen religion and not marginalize it. 
The anti-corruption rationale, moreover, continues to inform Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence.69  In striking down the school prayer at issue in Engel v. 
Vitale,70 for example, the Court relied on that principle when it stated that “[t]he 
Establishment Clause . . . stands as an expression of principle on the part of the 
Founders of our Constitution that religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to 
permit its ‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil magistrate.”71 
Furthermore, because of the inevitable compromises inherent in public action, 
any government support of religion is likely to be watered down.  The state 
authored prayer at issue in Engel, for example, was accurately described as little 
more than a “pathetically vacuous assertion of piety”72 than it was a true religious 
exercise.73  One then has to question whether government displays of religious 
symbols truly are beneficial to religion.  After all, what message does it send to 
students that lay teachers and caretakers are charged with maintaining an icon that 
                                                                                                     
 66. See Elwyn A. Smith, Religious Liberty in the United States:  The Development of Church-State 
Thought Since the Revolutionary Era 15-26 (Fortress 1972) (detailing the involvement of Isaac Backus, 
a New England pastor, in advocating the evangelical theory of separation of church and state); Timothy 
L. Hall, Roger Williams and the Foundations of Religious Liberty, 71 B.U. L. REV. 455, 469 (1991) 
(explaining Roger Williams repeated assertion that government should not be involved with the 
“spiritual affairs of the people”).  See generally Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 868 (2000) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“The establishment prohibition of government religious funding . . . [i]s meant . . . to 
protect the integrity of religion against the corrosion of secular support . . . .”). 
 67. See Timothy L. Hall, Roger Williams and the Foundations of Religious Liberty, 71 BU L REV 
455, 469 (1991). 
 68. Howe, supra note 50, at 6. 
 69. Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1831, 1934 (2009). 
 70. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 71. Id. at 431-32. 
 72. Louis H. Pollak, The Supreme Court 1962 Term - Foreword:  Public Prayers in Public Schools, 
77 HARV. L. REV. 62, 63 (1963). 
 73. The exact prayer at issue in Engel was “Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon 
Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our teachers and our Country.”  370 U.S. 421, 422 (1962). 
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is supposed to represent sanctity and holiness?   
B.  The Concern With Religious Divisiveness 
The concern with lessening religious divisiveness is an even more powerful 
argument against Professor Weiler’s position in Lautsi.  Throughout this 
Symposium, we have discussed Lautsi in the context of the conflict between 
religion and non-religion.  But there is a potentially greater and more virulent 
conflict that can be triggered when the government chooses to display religious 
symbols; the conflict between one religion and another.  Allowing the state to pick 
and choose which religion to favor inevitably leads to religions competing with 
each other for favored status and it further leads to resentment and alienation 
among those not chosen.  This is not a prescription either for a healthy democracy 
or for limiting sectarian strife.  For this reason, American nonestablishment 
jurisprudence has rightly suggested that the prevention of political divisiveness 
along religious lines is an important nonestablishment clause goal.74 
Of course, it may be, with respect to Lautsi itslef that the potential for sectarian 
conflict is not as great in Italy as elsewhere because of the uncontested status of 
Catholicism in that country’s history and culture.  It, therefore, may be 
understandable that the ECHR in Lautsi overlooked the divisiveness concern in 
reaching its result.  It may also be that Italy is not alone in this regard and there are 
other countries in the world where there is so little doubt as to the role that a 
particular religion has played in that country’s national identity, that its choice by 
the government for special acknowledgement might be seen as expected and 
therefore not divisive.  But during the colloquies at this Symposium, there was 
frequent mention of Ireland as such a country and I kept wondering exactly what 
part of Ireland was being discussed?  If the answer was the Republic of Ireland, so 
be it.  But let us think for a moment about Northern Ireland.  Whose religious 
symbols should be placed in the classrooms on that part of the island?  And what 
would be the likely result if the government of Northern Ireland decided to place 
the Protestant cross in the classrooms and not the Catholic crucifix, or vice versa?  I 
think we know the answer.  After all, even in the United States, people have died in 
fights over which religion’s version of the Ten Commandments is the correct one.75  
And that is exactly the problem.  Many people in the United States, for 
example, believe that there should be prayer in the public schools.76  But the 
consensus breaks down when the issue becomes “whose prayer?”77  So with that in 
                                                                                                     
 74. See sources cited supra note 53.  
 75. See RAY ALLEN BILLINGTON, THE PROTESTANT CRUSADE (1800-1860):  A STUDY OF THE 
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 143-44 (Rinehart & Co. ed., 1952) (1938) (noting that in 1844, riots 
erupted in Philadelphia between Catholics and Protestants over whose version of the bible should be 
used in the public school setting). 
 76. See, e.g., David W. Moore, Public Favors Voluntary Prayer for Public Schools:  But Strongly 
Supports Moment of Silence Rather Than Spoken Prayer, GALLUP (Aug. 26, 2005) 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/18136/public-favors-voluntary-prayer-public-schools.aspx (“76% of 
Americans favor ‘a constitutional amendment to allow voluntary prayer in public schools,’ while just 
23% oppose such an amendment.”). 
 77. For examples of the types of religious divisiveness that can arise when decisions about which 
prayers to use in government-led exercises are subject to the political process, see Christopher C. Lund, 
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mind, let us reconsider the hypothetical discussed in some of the oral remarks at 
this Symposium of a small community in Kentucky that is religiously homogenous 
(Protestant) and wants to celebrate its history, honor its traditions, and strengthen 
its community bonds by displaying the cross in its public school classrooms.  
Presumably, Professor Weiler would find that permissible.  But what happens when 
Catholics, for example, begin to move into the community?  When is the tilting 
point at which the classroom’s cross should be taken down?  At what point should 
a crucifix be displayed in its stead?  Equally importantly, how are these changes to 
be decided?  Should political campaigns be run on the basis of what religious 
symbol should be placed in the public schools?  What type of politics would 
result?78   
The Court in Engel v. Vitale79 recognized the basic dynamic that “zealous 
religious groups [may] struggle[] with one another to obtain the Government's 
stamp of approval . . . .”80  The Engel Court was correct.81  Placing the prize of 
government imprimatur of religion as a winnable political spoil is an invitation to 
the worst sorts of religious divisiveness.  It is also an invitation to those religions 
who would seek to establish dominance over others by gaining government 
approval.82  The Framers were well aware from their recent history as to why 
politics was especially hazardous when divided along religious lines.83  Our recent 
history is replete with examples such as Yugoslavia, Northern Island, and Kashmir, 
among others, that tragically demonstrate that the combination of politics and 
religion remains a dangerously combustible mix.  It may, of course, be argued that 
the reasons for religious strife in these countries stem from far deeper issues than 
the question of whose religious symbols would be placed in public school 
classrooms.  But Oliver Wendell Homes once wrote that “we live by symbols.”84  
And that is a reason to remember why, in cases like Lautsi, the stakes are so high. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Professor Weiler’s advocacy and his subsequent victory in Lautsi v. Italy 
                                                                                                     
Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious Endorsements, 94 MINN. L. REV. 972, 1045-46 
(2010). 
 78. I should emphasize in making this point that I am not claiming that religion should be excluded 
from politics.  What I am suggesting is that there are particularly dangerous and virulent politics that 
arise when politics are waged on sectarian grounds so that particular sects can win governmental 
favoritism and achieve political dominance.   
 79. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 80. Id. at 429. 
 81. If anything, this observation might be understated.  After all, even non-zealous religious groups 
may decide to enter the political fray if they see other religions vying for government imprimatur.  See 
William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 862-63 (1993).  At that point, 
the competition for government recognition may be seen as a test of faith for the religious adherent.  Id. 
 82. See Gene R. Nichol, Establishing Inequality, 107 MICH L. REV. 913, 930 (2009) (discussing the 
argument that the Establishment Clause is intended to prevent religious groups from using government 
power to establish dominance over other religious groups); MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF 
CONSCIENCE:  IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA'S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 224-305 (2008) . 
 83. See e.g. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1947).   
 84. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, John Marshall:  In Answer to a Motion That the Court Adjourn, on 
February 4, 1901, the One Hundredth Anniversary of the Day on Which Marshall Took His Seat As 
Chief Justice, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 266, 270 (1920). 
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profoundly reject importing American style nonestablishment law into the 
European Convention on Human Rights.  There is much to be said from this 
position.  One could learn much by negative example from the American 
nonestablishment experience.  Nonestablishment doctrine is incoherent, it cannot 
be rigidly enforced without doing damage to other important interests, and, as 
Weiler has powerfully argued, one of the major foundational arguments advanced 
in its behalf, its purported neutrality, is not even accurate.  Nonetheless, there are 
serious reasons for caution before too quickly following the path that Professor 
Weiler asks us to follow.  The nonestablishment principle does not, as Weiler 
suggests, subordinate religion to a dominant secularism.  Rather, it protects religion 
form external corruptions.  More importantly, nonestablishment removes from 
political contest any efforts by religion to gain state imprimatur.  As such, it offers 
a major advancement for avoiding the type of religious strife that has long plagued 
the European continent.  
  
